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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America 
since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have 
resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to 
physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State 
criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory 
control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in 
the retaken territories to regular police forces, with the hope 
that the territories and their populations will remain under 
the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and 
consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have 
adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. 
 
During such operations, governments need to pursue two 
interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical 
presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in 
those areas toward the state and away from the non-State 
criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, 
such operations entail several critical decisions and 
junctions, such as: 
 
 Whether or not to announce the force insertion in 
advance. The decision trades off the element of 
surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the 
criminal organizations against the ability to minimize 
civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, 
however, may allow criminals to go to ground and 
escape capture. Governments thus must decide 
whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups 
to other areas or maximize their decapitation 
capacity. 
 
 Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. 
Often, rival criminal groups arethe best source of 
intelligence. However, cooperation between the State 
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and such groups that goes beyond using vetted 
intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State 
tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law 
integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate 
even public safety gains. 
 
 Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is 
at times even more challenging than conducting the 
initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, 
traditional police forces, especially if designed as 
community police, have the capacity to develop trust 
of the community and ultimately focus on crime 
prevention, developing such trust often takes a long 
time.  
 
 To develop the community’s trust, regular police 
forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with 
intensive nonthreatening interactions with the 
population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, 
sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in 
designated beats for substantial amount of time, often 
at least over a year. 
 
 Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint 
police-citizens’ boards, further facilitates building 
trust in the police among the community. 
 
 After the disruption of the established criminal order, 
street crime often significantly rises and both the 
heavy-force and community-police units often 
struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime 
alienates the population of the retaken territory from 
the state. Thus developing a capacity to address street 
crime is critical. 
 
 
3 
 
 Moreover, the community police units tend to be 
vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by 
displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared 
territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal 
groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any 
established trust and being able to recover it. Rather 
than operating on an a priori determined handover 
schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength 
of regular police and the criminal groups post-
clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for 
timing the handover from heavy forces to regular 
police units. 
 
 Cleared territories often experience not only a peace 
dividend, but also a peace deficit –in the rise new 
serious crime (in addition to street crime).Newly-
valuable land and other previously-inaccessible 
resources can lead to land speculation and forced 
displacement; various other forms of new crime can 
also significantly rise. Community police forces often 
struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is 
frequently linked to legal businesses. Such new crime 
often receives little to no attention in the design of 
the operations to retake territories from criminal 
groups. But without developing an effective response 
to such new crime, the public safety gains of the 
clearing operations can be altogether lost. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
To an unprecedented degree, Latin Americans complain 
about living in fear of crime. With the exception of 
Colombia, criminal activity throughout the region has 
exploded. Rates of violent crime are six times higher in Latin 
America than in the rest of the world.
1
 El Salvador 
frequently ranks as one of the countries with the highest 
murder rate in the world, with 57.3 per 100,000 in 2007. In 
2006, Colombia’s murder rate was 42.8 per 100,000, and 
Venezuela’s 36.4 per 100,000 in 2007, and Brazil’s 20.5 in 
2008.
2
 Over 11,200 people died in drug-related violence in 
Mexico in 2010.
3
 Kidnapping in the region is also frequent.  
 
Organized crime is one of the principal sources of the 
violence. But street crime also flourishes in the region and 
frequently receives far less attention from the region’s 
governments. Two decades of efforts to improve and reform 
law-enforcement institutions in the region often have little to 
show in improvements in public safety and accountability of 
law enforcement.  
                                                 
1
See, for example, Jorge Sapoznikow et al., “Convivencia y Seguridad: 
Un Reto a la Gobernabilidad” (Coexistence and Security: A Challenge to 
Governability”, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC: 
2000, and Centro Nacional de Datos, Fondelibertad, Ministrio de 
Defensa Nacional, República de Colombia, “Cifras Extorsión” (Extortion 
Rates), June 20, 2007; available from 
www.antisecuestro.gov.co/documentos/7_16_2007_4_58_07_PM_Cifras
Historias.pdf, accessed May 17, 2008. 
2
 “Murder Rate Among Youths Soars in Brazil,” The Washington Post, 
February 24, 2011. Since data collection, reporting mechanisms, and 
strength of law enforcement varies greatly among Latin American 
countries and many murders go unreported and undetected, there are 
limits to the accuracy of the data. Moreover, data are not always 
available for the same year for all countries. 
3“Ejecutómetro 2010” (Metrics of Execution 2010), Reforma, December 
27, 2010; Grupo Reforma statistics cited in Transborder Institute, Justice 
in Mexico News Report, August 2011, www.justiceinmexico.org. 
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The response of Latin American countries to the crime 
epidemic has varied. Some, such as in Central America, have 
adopted the so-called mano dura (iron-fist) policies. Several 
countries have ultimately resorted to using heavy-armed 
police or outright military forces to retake territories with 
weak state presence and essentially governed by criminal 
groups or illegal militias (and in the case of Colombia, by an 
insurgent group). This article presents some of the key law 
enforcement lessons from retaking such urban spaces ruled 
by criminal groups. 
 
Brazil adopted such an approach in Sao Paolo and Rio de 
Janeiro in the 2000s. Rio’s Pacification Policy (UPP) toward 
the poor and crime-ridden favelas (slums) especially has 
received widespread attention. In Mexico, President Felipe 
Calderón deployed the military to Mexico’s streets to take 
over law enforcement functions in many of the country’s 
cities, including Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana. In Colombia’s 
Medellín, the counterinsurgency and anti-crime policies in 
the 2000s also follow similar patterns. President Álvaro 
Uribe first sent the military to the city in 2002 to retake the 
poor comunas ruled by the leftist guerrilla group the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC). That 
allowed the crime lord-cum-paramilitary leader Don Berna 
to consolidate his control over the criminal markets in the 
city. In the latter part of the 2000s, Don Berna was 
imprisoned and ultimately extradited to the United States. 
The Tivoli Gardens neighborhood of Kingston, Jamaica has 
been ruled for several decades by drug gangs linked to 
Jamaica’s political parties, including since the 1990s by the 
drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke. When in 2010 the 
Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding finally yielded to 
U.S. pressure to arrest Coke and extradite him to the United 
States, he resorted to sending a heavy force to the Tivoli 
Garden in an operation that resembled more urban warfare 
than a standard police arrest. 
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Between December 2009 and April 2011, I have conducted 
fieldwork in all the places mentioned above, with the 
exception of Jamaica.  The goal of my research was to study 
the design and effectiveness of the law enforcement 
approaches adopted in those places. For that purpose, I 
interviewed local government officials, police and military 
officers, academics and think tank experts, NGO 
representatives, journalists, residents of the poor 
neighborhoods, and, when possible, also members of the 
drug gangs and criminal groups operating in those areas. The 
lessons presented below are derived from this fieldwork. For 
the case of Jamaica, I rely on written analyses of other 
scholars. 
 
THE TWIN STATE-MAKING CHALLENGE  
 
When dealing with urban areas pervaded by illicit economies 
and violent criminality and inadequate State presence, where 
organized non-State actors are present, the government 
needs to pursue two interrelated objectives: First, it needs to 
better establish its own physical presence. In some cases, 
such as, for example, in Rio’s favelas, such an assertion (or 
even insertion) of State authority may require retaking 
territory that has been physically controlled by violent non-
State entities. In other cases, establishing such presence may 
entail demonstrating that the preponderance of physical 
power, if not actually monopoly on violence, lies with the 
State and its law enforcement apparatus. 
 
Second, the government needs to realign the allegiance of 
the population in those areas toward the State and away from 
the non-State criminal entities. For that, its presence needs to 
be not only robust, but also multifaceted and positive. In 
urban areas of inadequate State presence, great poverty, and 
social and political marginalization, large populations, 
numbering in the tens of thousands to over a million, are 
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dependent on illicit economies, including the drug trade, for 
economic survival and the satisfaction of their other socio-
economic needs. For many, participation in informal 
economies, if not outright illegal ones, is the only way to 
provide for their security and achieve social advancement, 
even as they continue to exist in a trap of insecurity, 
criminality, and marginalization. By sponsoring such illicit 
economies and using proceeds from them to deliver 
otherwise absent socio-economic goods and other public 
goods, non-State entities, such as criminal gangs, drug 
trafficking organizations, or urban militias, step into the 
stateless void. Paradoxically, these non-State entities often 
provide at least a modicum of security for the residents of the 
areas they control. Yes, they are the sources of insecurity and 
crime in the first place, but they often regulate the level of 
violence, suppress street crime, such as robberies, thefts, 
kidnapping, and even homicides. Their ability and 
motivation to provide public goods varies, of course, but 
such provision often takes place regardless of whether the 
non-State entities are politically-motivated actors or criminal 
enterprises.
4
 This explains how even non-ideological 
criminal groups can obtain and enjoy a great degree of 
political capital.
5
The more they deliver order, security, and 
economic goods, the more they become de facto proto-State 
governing entities.  
 
Obtaining trust and allegiance of the community is 
frequently a complex task that requires appropriate policies 
                                                 
4
 For some of the dimensions of how such delivery of public goods by 
non-State entities varies, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: 
Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2009). 
5
 For details, see, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Human Security and Crime in 
Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal 
Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies,” (WHEMSAC 
Monograph, Florida International University, Applied Research Center, 
September 2011). 
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and time. If the community had previously experienced 
primarily negative manifestations of the State -- such as 
violent repression against criminal groups, suppression of 
illegal economies but no provision of legal livelihoods, or 
social stigmatization -- it will be deeply mistrustful of greater 
State presence. 
 
Efforts to pacify violent and neglected urban areas thus 
parallel many aspects of population-centric 
counterinsurgency. Drawing such a parallel can be politically 
very sensitive in Latin America, where allusions to 
counterinsurgency (COIN) policy can conjure up vivid and 
painful memories of the region’s anticommunist 
counterinsurgency campaigns. However, the realization that 
some policies to combat urban violence mimic aspects of 
population-centric COIN policies does not imply that the 
State that faces violent urban challenges has failed. It does 
indicate that COIN and consolidation policies in places, such 
as Colombia or even more distant and very different locales, 
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, may nonetheless provide 
some important lessons. 
 
RETAKING TERRITORY 
 
In all the cases listed above, the government ultimately 
resolved that it had to physically “retake” the problematic 
urban space from non-State entities. In many of the cases, 
the government adopted such a policy only after other 
measures had been applied, often over many decades, such 
as physically blocking off and then ignoring the festering 
areas, negotiating multiple iterations of modus vivendi with 
the non-State entities controlling the urban space, or buying 
them off with political handouts.   
 
When  retaking or clearing operations have been employed 
since the 1990s in Latin America, these have usually 
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involved the insertion of “special” forces to supplement or at 
least temporarily replace regular police forces deemed to be 
too incompetent or corrupt to redress the levels of violent 
criminality that plague the community. Such physical 
retaking of urban space may have different connotations in 
different urban contexts: In Rio de Janeiro, the police had 
often been physically blocked off by the drug gangs from 
entering the favelas and, apart from highly violent raids into 
the poor neighborhoods, remained altogether absent. In the 
slums of Sao Paolo, the police were not as completely denied 
entry, but their presence consisted merely of sporadic and 
ineffective patrols. In the colonias of Ciudad Juárez, the 
police, although present to some extent, still were ineffective 
and unmotivated to roll back the control of the Drug 
Trafficking Organizations. 
 
What Clearing Means: Arrests? 
The underlying concept of the clearing operations is that 
either military forces or SWAT-type police forces retake the 
urban spaces from criminal groups and then, after a period of 
time of suppressing the local non-State entities, hand law 
enforcement responsibilities for the urban spaces back to 
regular police forces. To the extent that military forces in 
particular are deployed, they need to be deployed with a very 
clear operational mandate as to their specific task in the 
clearing operations: Are they supposed to merely protect 
police forces, with the latter remaining in charge of arrests 
and investigations? Are they only to patrol the streets, on the 
assumption that such patrols will reduce the violence, or are 
they also mandated to capture designated high-value targets? 
 
 Not specifying the military’s role to such a detailed level 
will limit the effectiveness of its operations and complicate 
interagency cooperation. Mexico since 2006 provides ample 
examples of such problems with an underspecified mandate 
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for the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement 
operations.
6
 
 
A primary question that needs to be answered in preparing 
such a clearing operation is whether or not to announce the 
force insertion in advance.  Announcing the raid in advance, 
as for example the government of Jamaica did when it finally 
decided to arrest Christopher “Dudus” Coke, can be an 
important mechanism for mitigating violence levels, limiting 
collateral damage, and minimizing other harms to the 
community.
7
 For example, advance warning can allow 
citizens to escape the crossfire by moving out of town for the 
duration of the operation. (Such population displacements 
even when actually temporary entail their own tough 
consequences and costs.) Prior announcements of clearing 
operations may also enhance the transparency of law 
enforcement actions, an outcome that can be a building block 
toward constructing the community’s trust in the 
government. Such transparency can be particularly important 
in areas where previous police incursions have been highly 
violent and brutal. And the early warning may deter the 
criminal gangs from resisting the law enforcement actions, 
once they appreciate the full scope and preponderance of 
State power they will face. 
 
However, such announcements come with costs. They can 
allow the criminal groups to dig in and develop defenses, 
preventing law enforcement forces from being able to 
                                                 
6
 See, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Addressing Organized Crime, Drug 
Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico: Lessons from Tijuana, Ciudad 
Juárez, and Michoacán,” section “Ciudad Juárez and the Evolution of 
Mexico’s Security Policy,” Brookings Institution, September 2011. 
7
 For details on Jamaica’s drug gangs, their relationship to political 
parties, and the 2010 operation to arrest Coke, see Desmond Arias, “The 
Impact of Organized Crime on Governance and Statebuilding,” Center 
for International Cooperation, New York University, forthcoming Dec. 
2011. 
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capitalize on the element of surprise. Such surprise often 
critically facilitates capturing key leaders of criminal groups. 
Even worse, it can induce members of the criminal groups to 
melt into the population or move to other areas for the 
duration of specialized forces presence. Government forces 
may find it extraordinarily difficult to sift through 
population, identify members of the criminal gangs, and 
locate its reputed leaders –especially where members of the 
criminal gangs come from the community, enjoy at least a 
degree of its support, and have a superior knowledge of the 
local urban terrain. Because the criminal organizations may 
have accumulated substantial political capital with the local 
population and because the population may fear violent 
reprisals for cooperating with law enforcement forces, the 
local population often tends to be extremely reluctant to 
provide actionable intelligence that can lead to the arrest of 
key leaders. Thus, Brazil’s BOPE forces, as the heavily-
equipped military-like police forces there are known, had to 
struggle to identify and arrest gang members during the 
clearing operations in Sao Paolo and in Rio, even though the 
BOPE tried to interrogate virtually every single male in some 
of the retaken shantytowns and impose population controls. 
When the local population provides intelligence at all, it is 
usually in areas where a gang had previously alienated the 
community through the use of violence that surpasses typical 
norms in the area.  
 
Accordingly, policymakers need to carefully assess, on a 
case-by-case basis, the extent to which not announcing an 
operation in advance will facilitate making arrests that 
critically weaken the criminal groups and can help anchor 
State presence in the community. Such assessments need to 
consider how easy it is for the criminal groups to generate 
new effective leadership and how much the government’s 
own violent tactics will alienate the community from the 
state. The fact that someone is the number one or two or 
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three in a criminal group does not mean that arresting him 
(or her, in some cases) would result in the collapse of the 
criminal group. Many so-called high-value targets (HVTs) 
should rather be thought of as high-visibility targets instead 
of having a real interdiction value in the sense that their 
arrests will severely limit the regeneration and leadership 
capacity of the criminal group. Historically, criminal groups 
have been able to replace their captured leaders rather easily, 
far more so than terrorist groups. Mexico has been learning 
this painful lesson over the past five years. 
 
Who Provides Intelligence? 
Frequently, intelligence flows during clearing operations 
come from rival criminal groups or militias. In Tijuana, for 
example, during the military operations in the late 2000s, the 
Sinaloa DTO allegedly was particularly effective in taking 
advantage of the government-installed hotline to provide 
information on its rivals.
8
  In Medellín in the early 1990s, the 
Cali cartel and Los Pepes, a militia precursor to the later 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary 
forces, provided critical intelligence on Pablo Escobar’s 
Medellín cartel and physically cooperated with Colombia’s 
security forces in the Medellín cartel’s destruction.9 In a 
similar way, Medellín crime lord Don Berna cooperated with 
the Colombian military in destroying the presence of the 
FARC in the city in 2002. It would be foolish of course not 
to take advantage of such intelligence flows, especially as 
other criminal entities may have far superior knowledge of 
                                                 
8
 See, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Addressing Organized Crime, Drug 
Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico: Lessons from Tijuana, Ciudad 
Juárez, and Michoacán,” section “The Tijuana Law Enforcement Model 
and Its Limitations,” Brookings Institution, September 2011. 
9
 For details, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market in 
Mexico and Lessons from Colombia,” Brookings Institution, March 
2009, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/03_mexico_dru
g_market_felbabbrown/03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf. 
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the targeted criminal group than the government. However, 
intelligence from such sources needs to be very carefully 
vetted.  
 
Moreover, relying on or sanctioning the physical actions of 
criminal groups or militias against other violent non-State 
entities tend to come with severe costs for the state and 
society. Both in Colombia and in Rio de Janeiro, where such 
groups emerged in the 2000s, the militias’ ability to deliver 
real security was limited. They often repressed the rival 
criminal or insurgent group only as much as was necessary 
to minimally satisfy their State or business sponsors and they 
turned out to be extremely abusive toward the community. 
They took over various forms of extortion and criminal 
activity and provided even fewer public goods and services 
to the marginalized community than did the criminal or 
insurgent entities they displaced. Even when the Colombian 
State or the Rio de Janeiro municipal authorities and 
business elite found themselves less threatened by the new 
criminal order, the community in the marginalized urban 
space often suffered greater physical abuse and socio-
economic privation than before.  
 
Moreover, apart from the inherent violations of the rule of 
law and citizens’ human rights, the control of such actors 
presents a huge challenge to the State. Since the late 2000s in 
Medellín, for example, even after Don Berna was extradited 
to the United States, the remnants of his criminal militias 
have physically targeted ex-FARC combatants who have 
gone through the reintegration process sponsored by the 
Colombian government, de facto preventing them from 
living in Medellín and undermining the government’s 
security policy.
10
 In Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
DTOs managed by the government’s law enforcement 
agencies were able to corrupt and completely eviscerate 
                                                 
10
 Author’s interviews in Medellín, January 2011. 
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these agencies.
11
  More often than not, places as diverse as 
Medellín, Ciudad Juárez, Mogadishu, and Karachi have 
learned that the State-tolerated militias/criminal groups over 
time start disobeying their political and State overlords. At 
times, they even try to become the powerholders dictating 
the terms of business and politics. 
 
What Clearing Means: Displacement of Criminals? 
Displacement of criminal groups to other areas is also costly. 
Often the State lacks the capacity to inject sufficient law 
enforcement forces to all areas. Instead of achieving an 
spreading ink-spot of security (with the zone of effective 
public safety steadily expanding),  clearing operations may 
essentially amount to a shell game, with violent criminality 
and its associated social ills moving to other areas of weak 
state presence. To an important degree, such displacement is 
taking place in Rio de Janeiro under the current UPP policy, 
for example, with violent criminal gangs and violent criminal 
enterprises relocating from the favelas near the city center to 
the southern outskirts of the city.  
 
Even if only a relocation of the criminals is taking place, the 
State may prefer such an outcome if the clearing operations 
retake a particularly strategic area, such as a city center. 
Since city centers tend to be areas where business elites 
operate and sometimes live, the State may have some 
legitimate reasons to prioritize such areas. If the urban 
business elite decide to move away, as is, for example, 
happening in Acapulco today, such an exodus may lead to a 
brain drain and capital fight. That can in turn undermine both 
the administrative capacity of local authorities and the legal 
economy and hence, job generation and fiscal revenues of 
the city. Insecure business elites who enjoy important 
political power may be particularly effective advocates of the 
use of heavy-handed, human-rights-insensitive crime 
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suppression measures, such as the various mano dura 
approaches that have proliferated around Latin America. 
Business elites may also be highly motivated and tend to be 
well-positioned to sponsor illegal militias that go beyond 
private security companies. Such extralegal “anti-crime” 
groups generate their own criminality, deeply undermine 
citizens’ security, and weaken the Sate in the long run. Thus 
enhancing public safety in the city center may be a well-
placed priority for the State. But without a credible plan to 
expand public safety provision to less privileged citizens and 
areas beyond the city center, merely pacifying the city center 
is insufficient. In the worst outcome, the government’s 
actions can spread violent criminality without achieving 
adequate improvement anywhere. 
 
Sustaining Security 
The other serious consequence of allowing criminals to 
temporarily go to ground as a result of announcing clearing 
operations in advance is that when the heavy police forces 
leave the retaken territory, the regular police forces may not 
be able to hold the territory. The regular police forces may 
be unable able to cope with a highly violent effort on the part 
of the criminal groups to take the territory. For example, 
since the BOPE forces left Cidade de Deus, one of Rio’s 
famous favelas and one of the first to be treated to the UPP 
policy, and security there was transferred to the UPP 
community police,  rumors have circulated several times that 
the Comando Vermelho gang was massing forces to push out 
the UPP police and reoccupy the favela. Although 
fortunately such a takeover has not materialized, the mere 
rumors have frightened the community sufficiently to limit 
extensive cooperation with the government.
12
 
 
Even if criminals are pushed out from the city center to the 
outskirts or if a cordon sannitaire can be established around 
                                                 
12
 Author’s interviews in Rio de Janeiro, January 2010. 
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selected strategic areas, the effects of insecurity in the 
outskirts, such as from extortion driving legal enterprises out 
of businesses, may leak back into the city center, 
undermining security achievements in the prioritized zones. 
Thus the selection of what problematic urban areas will be 
selected for law enforcement action needs to be guided by a 
strong focus on the sustainability of the security to be 
provided in those  spaces, rather than, for example, on the 
basis of the intensity of violence in an area or its electoral 
significance.  
 
The insertion of heavy police or outright military force 
almost always tends to be temporary –for two basic reasons: 
First, the State often lacks sufficient numbers of such forces 
to cover all the areas in-need with a sufficiently-high troop 
density to achieve preponderance of power. Second, the 
heavy-handed use of force has other important shortcomings 
– in terms of civil liberties and human rights protection, but 
also in terms of developing local intelligence. Even when 
actually subject to substantial human rights training, a rare 
occurrence for heavy police and military forces in Latin 
America, the SWAT forces are built specifically to project 
great force. For that reason and because their personnel are 
alien to the retaken community, they often have to struggle 
to establish trust, develop deep knowledge of the 
community, and generate local intelligence. 
 
Timing the Handover 
Timing the handover to regular police forces -- ideally, 
community police -- however, is complex. In some cases, 
such as in the Sao Paolo operations, the BOPE forces were 
inserted into the shantytowns with a specific timetable: they 
were expected to be present for about eight weeks after 
which law enforcement would be handed over to regular 
police forces. In other places, such as in Ciudad Juárez, the 
duration of the deployment of the military forces was not 
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specified in advance. However, the departure of the military 
forces from Ciudad Juárez was driven far more by a negative 
reaction of the residents to the excesses of the military forces 
and by the failure of the military forces to reduce violence 
levels in the city, than by their success in doing so. If the 
heavy forces are pulled out prematurely and the cleared area 
is again retaken by violent criminal entities, the ability of the 
State to generate trust in its law enforcement a second time 
around will be greatly undermined. Rather than operating on 
an a priori determined handover schedule, a careful 
assessment of the criminal groups’ strength remaining after 
clearing operations and of the capacity of regular police 
forces is likely to be a better guide for the handover. 
However, the goal should be to minimize the duration, 
extent, and lethality of the heavy forces as much as possible. 
 
Establishing the Local Community’s Trust 
Unlike heavy-force law enforcement units, regular police 
forces, especially if designed as community police, can have 
the capacity to develop the trust of and support from the 
local population. Thus they potentially have the capacity to 
move away from crime suppression solely toward crime 
prevention. However, for them to develop such capacity, 
they need to solve intelligence problems that are different 
from those of units designed for the capture of high-value 
criminal targets. Instead of having the vetted, insulated and 
small intelligence units needed for the latter, community 
police forces need to have a permanent and widespread 
presence within the community. They need to conduct 
frequent, often on-foot patrols.  A permanent police station 
in an urban slum where the police play cards inside the 
station and rarely venture outside among the slum residence 
will not be able to develop much local knowledge and 
intelligence capacity.  
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Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed 
in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at 
least over a year. Without a robust presence, without a 
sufficient density of police officers per neighborhood, the 
beat patrols will feel vulnerable and may be tempted to 
retreat to the police station. Concentrating police resources, 
including police patrol presence, may well be politically 
difficult, but it is necessary.  
 
In order to get to know the criminals, the local police patrols 
need to get to know the community and interact with it 
frequently and in a nonthreatening manner. The UPP forces 
in Rio de Janeiro have been operating under such guidelines, 
and at least in some “pacified” favelas have been began 
developing the trust of the community.
13
Colombia too has 
been unveiling an urban policing plan built upon such 
principles, called Plan Nacional de Vigiliancia Comunitaria 
por Cuadrantes; but it is too early to assess the effectiveness 
of the policy. 
 
Establishing Oversight Mechanisms  
Apart from having a sufficient density of police officers and 
sufficient intensity of nonthreatening interactions with the 
community, establishing the trust of the local community 
also requires setting up oversight and accountability 
mechanisms of police forces. Such mechanisms include 
establishing joint citizen-police boards that allow experts and 
community representatives to provide input to law 
enforcement and mandating reporting and careful 
examination of violent police actions. In Great Britain or the 
United States, for example, police officers often have to file 
a report every time they discharge their weapons.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Author’s interviews in the Babylonia favela in Rio de Janeiro,  
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Standing Up Community Police Forces 
Standing up police forces takes time. In the United States, 
regular police officers, for example, receive at least six 
months of training. In Mexico, where police reform is a 
major component of the security overhaul, many police 
officers receive only eight weeks of training. The quality of 
training – from how to handle a weapon to respect for human 
rights – also matters critically as does the post-training 
standard operating procedures and leadership of the units 
into which new recruits are placed. Even under auspicious 
circumstances,  effective police reform often requires a 
decade: essentially a generation of officers needs to be 
promoted from beat cops to key leadership positions and 
commitment to police reform needs to be sustained during 
that period at all levels of the police hierarchy.  
 
Conducting police reform during times of intense and highly 
violent criminal activity tends to be particularly problematic. 
Law enforcement becomes overwhelmed and its energies 
preoccupied with responding to crime (and sometimes even 
hanging on for dear life) and diverted away from reforms. 
Thus, if some urban areas register a decline in violent crime, 
the State needs to take advantage of such opportunities to 
deepen and strengthen police reform. Such an opportunity 
should not be missed even if such a decline in criminal 
violence came as a result of a truce among the criminal 
entities. 
 
HOLDING AND TACKLING “NEW” CRIME 
 
Apart from preserving and enlarging the security generated 
by suppression of the previous criminal groups of the 
marginalized urban areas, the regular police forces also need 
to be able to suppress the street crime and new organized 
crime that are likely to emerge in the “pacified” areas. The 
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destruction of the previous criminal order does not mean that 
a benevolent crime-free order emerges in its wake. 
 
Often, criminal groups function as security providers 
(suboptimal as they are), regulating and punishing theft, 
robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their 
rules and punishments for transgressions. The removal of the 
criminal gangs often results in a rise of street crime that can 
become a critical nuisance to the community and discredit 
the presence of the State and its law enforcement. That has in 
fact been the case in both Medellín in the post-Don Berna 
order as well as in the pacified favelas of Rio.
14
Especially in 
areas where police have been trained as light 
counterinsurgency forces (in Latin America, unlike South 
Asia, this is more often a problem in rural areas rather than 
in urban spaces) they may be undertrained, under-resourced, 
and not focused on addressing street crime. Even 
community-policing forces may have little capacity to 
undertake criminal investigations that lead to meaningful 
prosecution, yet police units specialized in criminal 
investigations may continue to be too far away and have 
limited access to a pacified urban space to conduct 
investigations that reduce street crime. Providing training to 
community police forces for tackling at least some street 
crime and streamlining and facilitating the presence of 
specialized criminal investigation units, such as homicide 
squads and prosecutors, are of critical importance for 
improving public safety for the community and for 
anchoring State presence in the pacified areas. 
 
Under some circumstances, law enforcement actions against 
the governing criminal entity may give rise to intense turf 
warfare among other criminal groups over the spoils of the 
criminal market. After Don Berna was extradited to the 
                                                 
14
 Author’s interviews in Rio de Janeiro, January 2010 and Medellín, 
February 2011. 
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United States, for example, many criminal gangs in and 
around Medellín, including two large ones led by Sebastian 
and Valenciano, began fighting each other over smuggling 
routes, local drug distribution, prostitution enterprises, and 
protection rackets. The turf war triggered extensive violence, 
including homicide rates in over 100per 100,000 in the late 
2000s and on par with those before the FARC was defeated 
in the city, and Don Berna established his “narco-
peace”.15Similarly in Mexico, law enforcement actions 
against established DTOs triggered intense violence among 
splinter groups and new gangs, such as in the Mexican state 
of Michoacán where interdiction operations against La 
Familia Michoacana have given rise to Los Templarios. That 
criminal gang has since been battling with Los Zetas, another 
of Mexican DTOs originating as splinter group, over control 
of criminal markets in the state. Such turf wars can 
compromise the physical and economic security of local 
communities far more than even the previous criminal order. 
 
In some circumstances, an urban area to which State 
presence has been extended may even suffer a peace deficit. 
Along with or instead of the hoped-for peace dividend of 
legal businesses moving into the urban space and providing 
legal jobs and income, the new areas may be attractive as a 
source of new land to be taken over by nefarious land 
developers. Such demands for land in the newly “pacified” 
urban areas may generate new forced land displacement, 
instead of benevolent gentrification. In rural spaces, the 
cause of such new illegal displacement may be the presence 
of profitable resources, such as gold, coal, and others, or the 
agricultural potential of the land, such as for African oil palm 
plantations. In urban spaces, housing development and real 
                                                 
15
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Reducing Urban Violence: Lessons from 
Medellín, Colombia,” The Brookings Institution, February 14, 2011, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0214_colombia_crime_felbabb
rown.aspx. 
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estate speculation may well drive such illegal displacement. 
Competition over State resources inserted to “pacified” 
areas, such as for socio-economic development, may 
generate new temptations of illegal behavior. Militias or new 
criminal groups seeking to set up new protection rackets and 
usurp the inserted State resources may well emerge. Many 
urban spaces in Colombia suffer from such old-new 
criminality today, as they have historically. 
 
Local community forces, even while effective at keeping the 
old criminals out, may not have the capacity to prevent such 
nefarious activities cloaked as legal development. At the 
same time, criminal units specializing in white-collar 
organized crime and asset expropriation are often located in 
the city center of a State capital far away from the “pacified” 
slums and may be paying little attention to such phenomena 
in the newly-liberated spaces. Moreover, since such land 
takeover and asset expropriation may well be linked to legal 
and politically-powerful developers, municipal authorities 
may lack the motivation to pay close attention to such 
criminal developments in the “pacified” urban areas.  
 
Yet without diligent and concerted law enforcement actions 
against such new crime, the benefits of the complex and 
costly State interventions in the marginalized urban areas 
may be altogether lost. Instead of addressing the causes of 
illegal economies and violent organized crime by 
strengthening effective and accountable State presence, the 
State intervention may ultimately only alter the manifestation 
of illegality and displace existing problems to other areas. 
Not only criminality and criminal gangs, but also the 
marginalized residents of the urban shantytowns themselves 
may merely be forced out to other slums. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Several key elements determine the effectiveness of law 
enforcement operations to retake urban spaces governed by 
violent non-State entities: the ability to develop intelligence 
for arrests of critical operators of the criminal groups and 
evidence for their effective prosecution, the ability to 
develop trust of the local community, such as by minimizing 
violence and establishing community police units, the ability 
to effectively address street and new organized crime likely 
to emerge post clearing operations, and the ability to sustain 
security after the heavy-force units depart. Apart from these 
modalities of the actual law enforcement operation, the 
success of increasing public safety in problematic urban 
neighborhoods cannot be divorced from the capacity to 
provide effective and speedy dispute resolution mechanisms 
and access to the justice system in the “pacified” spaces. 
 
Ultimately, an effective State strategy toward organized 
crime is not merely one of law enforcement suppression of 
crime. Law enforcement plays a critical and indispensible 
role; it is the founding block of establishing effective State 
presence. But an appropriate response toward dealing with 
marginalized urban spaces is ultimately a multifaceted state-
building strategy that seeks to strengthen the bonds between 
the State and marginalized communities. 
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